SB 967: CA Activists Seek to Redefine Consensual Sex as Rape

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California activists seek to redefine quiet, consensual sex as rape through Senate Bill 967

By Hans Bader March 9, 2014

How does classifying most consensual sex as rape help rape victims? As a lawyer who has handled rape and sexual harassment cases, I have no idea, but this radical result is what some want to happen in California. In endorsing a bill in the California legislature that would require “affirmative consent” before sex can occur on campus, the editorial boards of the Sacramento and Fresno Bee and the Daily Californian advocated that sex be treated as “sexual assault” unless the participants discuss it “out loud” before sex, and “demonstrate they obtained verbal ‘affirmative consent’ before engaging in sexual activity.” Never mind that consent to most sex is non-verbal, and that rape has historically been understood to be an act against someone’s will, rather than simply a non-violent act that they did not consent to in advance. Perhaps in response to the bill, the University of California, on February 25, adopted a policy requiring affirmative consent not just to sex, but to every form of “physical sexual activity” engaged in.

I and my wife have been happily married for more than a decade, and like 99.9% of married couples, we do not engage in verbal discussion before engaging in each and every form of sexual activity. Indeed, in the first year of our daughter’s life, when she was a very light sleeper (she would wake up if you merely walked into her bedroom and stepped on a creaky part of the bedroom floor), it would have been unthinkable for us to engage in any kind of “out loud” discussion in our bedroom, which is right next to hers (the walls in our house are very thin, and you can hear sounds from one room in the next room). We certainly did not verbally discuss then whether to have sex. Having sex quietly when you are a parent is a sign that you are considerate of sleeping family members, and have a healthy marriage, not of sexual abuse.

The affirmative-consent bill, Senate Bill 967, does not explicitly require verbal permission to demonstrate consent, although it warns that “relying solely on nonverbal communication can lead to misunderstanding.” But supporters of the bill are very clear about their desire to require verbal discussion or haggling prior to sex. The Fresno Bee praised the bill because “it adopts in campus disciplinary cases the ‘affirmative consent standard,’ which means that ‘yes’ only means ‘yes’ if it is said out loud.” The Daily Californian declared that “the proposal’s requirement that defendants in a sexual assault case demonstrate they obtained verbal ‘affirmative consent’ before engaging in sexual activity makes SB 967 a step in the right direction.” Since most couples have engaged in sex without “verbal” consent, supporters of the bill are effectively redefining most people, and most happily-married couples, as rapists. By demanding verbal discussion before sex, they are also meddling in people’s sex lives in a prurient fashion.

Requiring people to have verbal discussions before sex violates their constitutional privacy rights, under the logic of Supreme Court decisions such as Lawrence v. Texas (2003), which struck down Texas’s sodomy law, and federal appeals court decisions like Wilson v. Taylor (1984), which ruled that dating relationships are protected against unwarranted meddling by the Constitutional freedom of intimate association. It also serves no legitimate purpose, since even supporters of the bill, like Tara Culp-Ressler have on other occasions admitted that sexual violence is not the result of mixed signals: studies show that people who commit sexual violence are almost always aware that what they are doing is against the will of their victims, rather than the assault being the product of “blurred” communications. When I was subjected to unwanted intimate groping as a child, the perpetrator knew quite well that what he was doing was inappropriate. Defining sex as rape merely because there was no verbal discussion in advance trivializes rape and brands innocent people as rapists (including some people who themselves have been sexually victimized in the past).

Disturbingly, it’s not just sex they want to regulate, but also “sexual activity” in general. The bill may require affirmative consent before multiple steps in the process of foreplay that leads to sex, even between couples who have engaged in the same pattern of foreplay before on countless occasions. The bill states, “’Affirmative consent’ is a freely and affirmatively communicated willingness to participate in particular sexual activity or behavior, expressed either by words or clear, unambiguous actions. . . The existence of a dating relationship between the persons involved, or the fact of a past sexual relationship, shall not provide the basis for an assumption of consent.” This disregards common sense, since what people intend or consent to is often illustrated by the history or nature of their relationship, such as when courts determine the intent of the parties to a contract by looking at the past course of dealings between the parties.

The bill seems to be based on the false assumption that the more explicit consent is, the more pleasurable the activity consented to is. But in the real world, the opposite is usually true, and the explicitness of consent is not a good gauge of an activity’s welcomeness.

For example, my wife and daughter never ask for, or seek, permission before they hug me. Precisely because they know it would be welcome. Explicit consent is unnecessary when something is harmless and unobjectionable (or downright enjoyable, like sex between married couples).

By contrast, grudgingly consensual sex acts, like those between a prostitute and her clients, are generally preceded by explicit discussion and verbal agreement, because one party wants sex, while the other merely puts up with it to obtain money or other benefits. A verbal request followed by an explicit “yes” often reflects an imbalance in sexual desire between partners, not the ideal in which both partners deeply want it. Rather than disrupting the rhythms of a couple’s lovemaking by requiring explicit discussion, these people should recognize that an explicit “yes” is not the ideal. When I told one of my past housemates, a court reporter who has taken depositions in sexual harassment and assault cases, about a similar proposed definition at Harvard, where I got my law degree, she was amazed. She could not think of anything more awkward than being asked point blank for sex by a would-be partner.

In addition to endangering privacy rights, SB 967 also contains provisions that could undermine students’ due process rights, such as mandating a low standard of proof for discipline, and encouraging anonymous allegations, as I explained in a letter published last month in the Sacramento Bee. The bill’s requirements apply not just to public colleges, but also to certain private colleges.

On February 25, the University of California system appears to have essentially adopted most of the requirements of SB 967, in a new policy defining “sexual assault” and “sexual violence,” defining it to include some conduct that is not violent at all. What concerns me most is that the policy defines “sexual assault” to require “unambiguous” “affirmative” consent prior not just to penetration (which is not always unreasonable if consent is defined to include non-verbal cues as well as verbal responses), but also “physical sexual activity” in general. Effectively, this might ban foreplay as it commonly occurs among married and unmarried couples alike. Things like vaginal intercourse generally are in fact preceded by non-verbal affirmative permission, since it generally requires physical movements by both parties to facilitate.

But most “sexual activity” falling short of actual intercourse (i.e., foreplay) is not preceded by affirmative permission or consent. Instead, it is often acquiesced in by the recipient as part of a process of gradual escalation in which each partner engages in a new form of intimate contact that that the other acquiesces in. For example (and I regret the necessity of providing these graphic examples, which are necessary for the sake of clarity), the husband starts touching or licking his wife’s breasts to see if she likes it and to turn her on, or the wife grabs the husband’s member while in bed with him engaging in foreplay (to get him firm enough for penetration), that might constitute sexual assault under this policy, even if it is welcome and enjoyed.

Why? because it is not preceded by “an affirmative . . . decision” to consent by the recipient, but rather is initially acquiesced in. The “consent” follows the activity, rather than preceding it, meaning the activity was potentially non-consensual for at least a brief time before the recipient became aware of it and consented to it. These activities are essential to foreplay, and are a step-by-step process that would be ruined by explicit discussion at every step (it would ruin the mood, thus defeating the very purpose of foreplay). My wife would be very annoyed if we verbally discussed these things. Thus, both husband and wife are defined as sexual assault perpetrators by this bill. Requiring consent in advance under these circumstances is sexually repressive and unfair. Foreplay is a long progression of steadily escalating intimacy in which each partner alternately initiates and acquiesces in deeper intimacies, not a sudden act that requires prior discussion.

Yet, the University of California policy says:

“Sexual Assault occurs when physical sexual activity is engaged without the consent of the other person or when the other person is unable to consent to the activity. . . .Consent is informed. Consent is an affirmative, unambiguous, and conscious decision by each participant to engage in mutually agreed-upon sexual activity. . .Consent means positive cooperation in the act or expression of intent to engage in the act . . . Consent to some form of sexual activity does not imply consent to other forms of sexual activity. Consent to sexual activity on one occasion is not consent to engage in sexual activity on another occasion. A current or previous dating or sexual relationship, by itself, is not sufficient to constitute consent. . .Consent must be ongoing throughout a sexual encounter.”

Although this language is vague (at one point, it allows consent to be based on “positive cooperation,” which might extend beyond consent in advance), it clearly defines some sex and sexual activity as sexual assault on campus, even if it would be perfectly legal off campus (it does so even more clearly than SB 967 does). It does that even though college students are largely adults who have the right to vote, get married, and serve in the military. For example, students have First Amendment rights that are largely “coextensive” with their rights in society generally, as the Supreme Court has indicated in decisions such as Papish v. University of Missouri Curators, Healy v. James, and Rosenberger v. University of Virginia. (Disclosure: I used to practice education law for a living.).

The assumption seems to be that California’s general definition of sexual assault, which applies off campus, is too narrow. But this assumption is dubious, and in a few rare situations, the existing California definition of sexual assault may already be too broad. Men and women involved in sexual relationships learn the intimate preferences of their partners. As a result, they often know without discussion when their partner desires sex, and can often tell in advance from context whether their partner will welcome a particular sexual act. For example, the former girlfriend of a college hallmate of mine at the University of Virginia would sometimes awaken him through oral stimulation, evincing her desire for intercourse, which generally ensued between them without discussion. Under existing California law, this pleasurable activity is already treated as sexual assault, since a California appellate decision ruled that people cannot consent to future sex while incapacitated. But every person who heard this anecdote thought my hallmate was a lucky man, not a victim of sexual assault (the pleasure of sex may in some cases be enhanced by the element of surprise). Thus, the current California legal definition of sexual assault already appears to be too broad, not too narrow, in such situations.

Source: libertyunyielding.com

Read more HERE: http://www.saveservices.org/2014/03/sb-967-ca-activists-seek-to-redefine-consensual-sex-as-rape/

We can’t end ‘rape culture’ if we don’t end hook-up culture

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This guy makes too much sense. Check out his blog – every day: The Matt Walsh Blog

 

Safer Campus (Students Active For Ending Rape) tried to spell this out on their website, explaining that there is a “spectrum of intoxication” and that consent must not only be affirmative, but “enthusiastic.”

Most rational people understand and agree that it is definitely rape when a conscious person decides to have sex with an unconscious person, but now we’re calling something rape if it doesn’t have the appropriate level of enthusiasm?

An article on the Huffington Post takes it a step further. In bold italics it exclaims: “Drunk people cannot give consent.” By this logic, of course, all drunk sex is rape. Only this particular article, like most articles on the subject, places the ‘rapist’ label squarely on the shoulders of the man.
The obvious question: if both are drunk, and both are unable to consent, but then both have sex, why is the man the only rapist in the transaction?
 
And if drunk consent is not consent, then what is consent? You might tell me that consent is affirmative, enthusiastic, and sober, but how do you account for the other exigent circumstances that might lead someone to give sober, affirmative, enthusiastic consent despite their internal hesitations?
 
What about the woman who has sex with her boyfriend because she believes (perhaps accurately) that he’ll leave if she doesn’t? What about the man who has sex with a woman, thinking that this will be the beginning of a long and meaningful relationship, only to find out that he’s just a rebound from her last fling? What about the woman who goes out looking for sex with a man, but only to fill the void left inside her after years of abuse and abandonment at home? What about the man who has sex with a woman because he believes it will make her love him, or the woman who has sex with a man under the same mistaken belief? What about the woman who is guilted into sex? What about the man having sex with a woman who only wants him for his money? What about a person, man or woman, who has sex with any other person, but wouldn’t have done it had they known the other’s intentions and motivations?
 
Are these people all victims of rape?
 
Read more at http://themattwalshblog.com/2014/06/11/we-cant-end-rape-culture-if-we-dont-end-hook-up-culture/#Xb92tJLbz38zuboL.99

SEX AND BOOZE

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Tip of the Week authored by Brett A. Sokolow, J.D., ATIXA Executive Director

Okay, so I’m all fired up again. In the last two weeks, I’ve worked on five cases all involving drunken hook-ups on college campuses. In each case, the male accused of sexual misconduct was found responsible. In each case, I thought the college got it completely wrong. My friends, these are challenging cases, no doubt. But, we have to get them right. We’ve written about this at length and talked about it forever, but some boards and panels still can’t tell the difference between drunk sex and a policy violation. Perhaps the problem stems from weak policy, insufficient training or the futility of the panel model. Regardless, we need to fix it.

So, let me come at this from another angle. Finding each of the accused in violation of sexual misconduct is sex discrimination. We are making Title IX plaintiffs out of them. The customs and practices of the field of higher education have adopted, as a common policy formulation, that sexual actions with a person the respondent knows to be incapacitated, or should know to be incapacitated by alcohol, drugs, sleep, etc., is prohibited. This is the non-discriminatory way to frame policy. But, in a recent case, the campus policy stated that intoxication creates an inability to consent. Thus, in any situation in which a male student and a female student have sex, and both are intoxicated, this college will commit an act of gender discrimination by only charging one of them. If both are intoxicated, they both did the same thing to each other. Why should only the male be charged if both students behave in ways defined as prohibited by the policy? I’m not suggesting we charge both. Surely, every drunken sexual hook-up is not a punishable offense, especially if the parties know what they did and liked it.

A common policy problem comes from failing to distinguish between intoxicated and incapacitated. Yet, the most serious issue comes from failing to implement a mens rea, if you will, within the
definition. Certainly, criminal concepts like mens rea are not strictly applicable to the campus conduct process, but if we agree as I stated above that having sex with a willing, yet intoxicated person is not an offense, there must be something that the respondent does, beyond having sex, that makes a lawful act (sex) into a policy violation.

In the common formulation I offered above, the key is that the respondent’s culpability rests on two factors, the incapacitation of the victim and his knowledge of that incapacitation, whether actual or constructive. Thus, the respondent does something more than to have sex, which is lawful. The respondent takes advantage of the victim’s incapacity, and the taking advantage is the harmful
element. The taking advantage comes because the respondent knows the victim is weak, unable to make reasonable decisions and cannot have knowledge of the act. This cannot be proved by the victim’s assertion of her own incapacity, blackout or lack of memory. This is shown by the totality of evidence composed of some or all of the following factors that the respondent knew or should have known:

The respondent knew that the complainant was drinking or using drugs and may know how much/what kind;

The victim was stumbling or otherwise exhibited loss of equilibrium;

Slurred speech or word confusion;

Bloodshot, glassy or unfocused eyes:

Any of the signs of alcohol poisoning;

Vomiting, especially repeatedly;

Being disoriented, or confused as to time, place, etc.; and/or

Loss of consciousness

A good policy cannot make it a violation simply for male students to have sex with an intoxicated person, if they are completely ignorant of that fact. Thus, they are just having sex. They do nothing that additionally transgresses, is wrongful or is intentional any more than they do every time they have
sex. There is no need for an intent to rape, but there has to be something more than an intent to have sex to make this an offense. Otherwise, men are simply being punished for having sex, which is gender discrimination under Title IX, because their partners are having sex too and are not being subject to the code of conduct for doing so. Without a knowledge standard, a respondent will suffer an arbitrary and capricious application of the college’s rules.